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Case No. 20170022 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEAL 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
TRAVIS SCOTT MURRAY, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
INTRODUCTION 
Murray pleaded guilty to felony driving under the influence of alcohol. 
It was his fourth DUL The dish·ict court imposed the statutory prison term, 
suspended it, and granted Murray probation. 
Murray admitted violating that probation by (1) using 
methamphetamine, cocaine, and alcohol, and (2) violating the ignition 
interlock requirement. At the revocation hearing, he asked for an 
opportunity for further treatment and to complete probation. He specifically 
objected only to serving any jail time. The State and Adult Probation and 
Parole asked the court to impose a one-year jail term to close the case out. 
The district court revoked and reinstated Murray's probation, ordered 
him to complete substance-abuse counseling, and imposed a 180-day jail 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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term. It said it was granting Murray's request with the exception that it 
imposed a 180-day jail term. Murray responded, "Thank you." He never 
objected that the court should have continued the original probation rather 
than revoking and reinstating probation. 
On appeal, Murray argues that the district court erred by revoking and 
reinstating probation rather than continuing his original probation. He 
argues that the error was plain because the probation relief granted varied 
from what both parties requested. But he cites no cases holding that the 
parties' requests bound a court's discretion about when and how to grant 
probation. 
And Murray has not otherwise shown that the district court plainly 
abused its discretion. The district court had to decide what to do with a 
habitual drunk driver who violated his probation by drinking alcohol and 
circumventing the ignition interlock requirement- the technological means 
intended to prevent him from driving drunk again. Rather than impose the 
original prison sentence or even sending Murray to jail for a year on an 
unsuccessful probation finding, the court exercised extraordinary grace and 
allowed him another opportunity to successfully complete his probation. 
And Murray has inadequately briefed his prejudice argument. He 
concludes that his probation likely would have ended sooner had the district 
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court not revoked and reinstated. But the court could have extended his 
original probation, and Murray offers no reasoned explanation why the 
district court would have chosen a shorter period on an extended rather than 
reinstated probation. 
ISSUE 
Has Murray shown that the trial court plainly erred when it revoked 
and reinstated his probation rather than continued his original probation? 
Standard of Review. Appellate courts review probation decisions for an 
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Snyder, 2015 UT App 172 ,I7, 355 P.3d 
246. Because Murray did not preserve the issue he raises on appeal, he must 
show that the district court plainly erred. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 2016 UT 
App 41 if 2, 368 P.3d 873. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Facts. 
A trooper pulled Murray over for speeding and running a red light. 
When the trooper talked to Murray, he could smell alcohol. Murray admitted 
consuming alcohol. The intoxilyzer revealed a breath alcohol content of .141. 
When the trooper checked Murray's driver record, he discovered that Murray 
had three prior DUI convictions. R4. 
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B. Proceedings. 
The State charged Murray with (1) third-degree-felony driving under 
the influence (Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-502 (West Supp. 2017-2018)), (2) class-
B-misdemeanor alcohol restricted driver (§41-6a-530 (West 2013)), (3) class-
C-misdemeanor speeding (§41-6a-601 (West 2013)), and (4) class-C-
misdemeanor running a red light (§41-6a-305 (West Supp. 2017-2018)). R2-3. 
Murray and the State worked out a plea agreement. Murray pleaded 
guilty to third-degree-felony DUI. In exchange, the State dismissed the other 
three counts and agreed to "recommend 62.5 days." R29-34. 
The district court entered judgment on March 17, 2014. It imposed and 
suspended the statutory zero-to-five-year prison term. It ordered Murray to 
serve 100 days in jail, giving him nine days credit for the time he already 
served. It imposed a $2876.70 fine. R40-41. 
The court also gave Murray probation. The conditions included (1) 
cooperating in treatment assessment and completing any treahnent deemed 
necessary, (2) refraining from alcohol and illegal drug use, (3) submitting to 
alcohol and drug testing, (4) paying for ignition interlock systems to be 
installed on any vehicle Murray owned or operated, (5) maintaining 
automobile insurance, and (6) reporting to Adult Probation and Parole as 
directed. R41. 
-4-
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About 23 months later, Murray violated his probation. AP&P reported 
10 violations. Murray admitted to four: (1) he used methamphetamine, 
cocaine, and alcohol; (2) he violated the ignition interlock restriction; (3) he 
operated a car without insurance; and (4) he failed to report as directed by 
AP&P. AP&P recommended terminating Murray's probation as 
unsuccessful and committing him to the Salt Lake County Jail for a term the 
district court would deem sufficient to close the case. R70-75, 103-104. 
At the subsequent hearing, the State submitted on AP&P' s 
recommendation and asked the court to impose a one-year jail term. R104-
106 (the entire hearing transcript is attached as addendum B). 
Murray's counsel opposed any jail time. She addressed the violations 
by explaining that Murray found himself homeless and "did not deal with'' 
the situation "in an appropriate way." She reminded that Murray "had 
established himself as someone who is able and willing to complete treatment 
and he already" had. But she also acknowledged that his "actions after that" 
had shown that "he could benefit from more treatment." She represented 
that Murray "would very much like to complete probation" and "the 
opportunity to do treatment." R102, 105-107. 
The district court acknowledged that Murray's use of controlled 
substances violated his probation. But it was the alcohol related violations 
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that troubled the court most. It emphasized that Murray was guilty of third-
degree-felony DUI because he had a history of DUI. It emphasized that his 
use of alcohol combined with violating the ignition interlock requirement 
made him a danger to himself, his family, and "the community as a whole." 
The court recognized that it "could very fairly" impose the original prison 
sentence because he had violated his probation. R110. 
The district court nevertheless decided not to impose the prison 
sentence. The court instead granted Murray's requests for an opportunity for 
additional treatment and to successfully complete probation. But the court 
imposed the price of a 180-day jail term. And the court warned that if Murray 
did not comply, he would not get "a year in jail to close," but Would instead 
face the original prison sentence. R111-12. 
The district court then revoked and reinstated Murray's probation for 
12 months from the date of the hearing and imposed the 180-day jail term. 
The court reiterated its view that the 180-day jail term was the only place 
where it and the defense disagreed. When the court concluded, Murray 
responded, "Thank you." He did not object that the court actually had not 
given him what he requested or that it should have continued probation 
rather than revoking and reinstating probation. Id. 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
A district court has discretion to grant, deny, or revoke probation. 
Even when a district court revokes probation, an appellate court will reverse 
only when the evidence of a probation violation is so deficient that the district 
court abused its discretion. And a single supported violation will justify a 
decision to revoke probation. 
Murray admitted to four probation violations. But he asked that the 
district court given him an opportunity to successfully complete probation 
and for more treatment. On appeal, he argues that the district court abused 
its discretion when it granted his request through revoking and reinstating 
his probation rather than continuing under the original probation. 
Murray did not preserve this argument. He never objected to the 
district court's chosen route to give him what he asked for. Instead, he 
thanked the court. 
On appeal, he has not proven plain error. He argues only that the 
district court plainly erred because its solution conflicted with what both 
parties requested. But he cites no clear law establishing that the parties' 
requests bounded the district court's discretion. 
Any he has not otherwise shown that the district court plainly abused 
its discretion. The court had to decide how to deal with a habitual drunk 
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driver whose probation violations showed he had again become a drunk-
driving threat to the community-he had resumed drinking and 
circumvented the interlock ignition probation requirement. Under the law, 
the court was entitled revoke probation. It chose instead to give Murray the 
opportunity he asked for. 
Finally, Murray has inadequately briefed his prejudice argument. He 
concludes that the original probation would likely have been completed by 
now. But because Murray violated his probation, the district court had 
authority to extend its original term. Murray offers no reasoned analysis why 
the court would have reached a different conclusion about how much longer 
to keep him on probation under the original probation instead of under 
revoked and reinstated probation. 
ARGUMENT 
The disi:rict court did not plainly abuse its discretion when in 
response to serious probation violations, it revoked and 
reinstated Murray's probation rather than continuing his 
original probation 
A dish·ict court has discretion to grant, deny, or revoke probation. See, 
e.g., Snyder, 2015 UT App 172 if 7. And even when a district court revokes 
probation, the appellate courts will not reverse unless '"the evidence of a 
probation violation, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings, is so deficient that the trial court abused its discretion .... "' Jenkins, 
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2016 UT App 41 if 2. Because Murray did not preserve his appellate 
argument-that the trial court should have continued the original probation 
rather than revoking it and reinstating it-he must show that the district 
court plainly abused its discretion. 
Murray has not met his burden. Here, the evidence of a probation 
violation was strong- Murray admitted to four violations. Yet the trial court 
still did not revoke his probation and send him to prison. It revoked and 
reinstated his probation to give him what he asked for-the opportunity for 
more treatment and to successfully complete probation. 
A. Murray did not preserve his appellate issue that the district 
court should have continued his probation rather than revoke 
and reinstate it. 
To preserve an issue for appeal, the appellant must have presented it 
to the district court in a way that gave the court a fair opportunity to rule on 
it. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 2014 UT App 114 if 10, 327 P.3d 589. Murray did 
not give the district a fair opportunity to rule on whether he was entitled to 
have his original probation continued or whether the court was free to revoke 
and reinstate his probation. In fact, the district court fairly believed that, with 
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one exception not relevant here, it had given Murray all that he had asked 
for. 1 
Murray told the district court he "would very much like to complete 
probation" and "the opportunity to do treatment." Rl0S-106. The district 
court gave him both- by reinstating probation, it gave him to opportunity to 
complete it, and it ordered further treatment as a condition of his reinstated 
probation. 
And it is clear from the record that the district court believed that it 
was giving Murray what he was asking for. The court said that Murray's 
"requests that [he] would like an opportunity to do this successfully and do 
treah11ent is going to be granted." The court then proceeded to revoke and 
reinstate probation and ordered that Murray successfully complete substance 
abuse treatment. Murray never objected that the court gave him less than he 
had asked for, let alone ask the court to continue his original probation. To 
the contrary, he thanked the court. Rlll-12. 
1 Murray expressly objected only to imposing jail time. In a footnote, 
Murray concedes that he has served his jail sentence and continues that he is 
serving the reinstated probation term "that is the subject of this appeal." 
Aplt.Br.6 n.1. Yet throughout his brief he argues that the district abused its 
discretion by both (1) revoking and reinstating probation, and (2) imposing a 
180-day jail term. Because he has served that term, the court cannot grant 
him relief and the issue is moot. 
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Nothing in this exchange gave the district court a fair opportunity to 
address whether it should have continued his original probation. Rather, 
everything suggested to the court that Murray was satisfied with revoking 
and reinstating his probation as the means to grant his requests for treatment 
and an opportunity to successfully complete probation. 
Murray nevertheless says he preserved the appellate issue "by trial 
counsel's argument to allow Murray to continue on probation without revoking 
and reinstating probation." Aplt.Br.9 (emphasis added). Except trial counsel 
never made that argument. She asked only that Murray have the opportunity 
to successfully complete probation. Rl0S-107. She never argued that the 
court should not grant that request by revoking and reinstating probation. 
Id. And when the district court said that it was granting counsel's request 
through revoking and reinstating probation, counsel did not object and 
Murray thanked the court. Rlll-12. 
Murray never gave the court a fair opportunity to address his appellate 
issue. That issue may therefore be reviewed only for plain error. 
B. Murray has not shown that the district court plainly abused its 
discretion by allowing him another opportunity to successfully 
complete probation through revoking and reinstating 
probation. 
Murray argues alternatively that the district court plainly erred by 
revoking and reinstating probation because, according to him, that relief 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conflicted with what the parties asked for. He says that the State asked to 
revoke his probation and impose a jail sentence. He says he asked the court 
to" continue on probation." Aplt.Br.10. 
But an "error is obvious only if I the law governing the error was clear 
at the time the alleged error was made."' State v. Maestas. 2012 UT 46 ,I37, 299 
P.3d 892 (citation omitted). Murray cites no case holding that a district court's 
probation decisions are limited to selecting between the parties' requests. He 
makes no other obvious error argument. His plain error argument fails for 
that reason alone. 2 
In any event, Murray cannot prove that the district court abused its 
discretion, plainly or otherwise. Even when a district court revokes 
probation, this Court will reverse only when 11111 the evidence of a probation 
violation, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings, is so 
deficient that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant's 
probation.""' Jenkins, 2016 UT App 41 ,I2 (citations omitted). A 111 single 
violation of probation is legally sufficient to support a probation revocation."' 
Snyder, 2015 UT App 172 ,I7, 355 P.3d 246 (citation omitted). 
2 As demonstrated in subpoint A, Murray did not make plain that the 
district court had somehow not followed his request. He asked for an 
opportunity to successfully complete probation. The district court gave him 
that instead of revoking his probation and sending him to prison. 
-12-
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Murray admitted four violations, three more than the district court 
needed to revoke his probation outright. The district court thus correctly 
recognized that it could have revoked Murray's probation and sent him to 
prison. 
But it didn't. Instead, the district court reinstated his probation. On 
this record, that was an act of extraordinary grace. This case was Murray's 
fourth DUI conviction. The violations that led to revoking his probation 
involved resumed alcohol use and circumventing the ignition interlock- the 
technological safeguard against him driving drunk yet again. The court 
rightly recognized that despite what he may have accomplished before, he 
had again become a threat to the community. Based on Murray's admitted 
probation violations and the renewed threat he posed, the court could have 
properly exercised its discretion to revoke his probation and send him to 
prison. The court nevertheless showed Murray extraordinary mercy by 
reinstating his probation. It thus did not plainly err by not granting relief that 
Murray never actually asked for in the first place- continuing with the 
original probation. 
Finally, Murray has inadequately briefed his prejudice argument, and 
the Court should affirm for that reason alone. Murray concludes that had the 
district court continued his original probation he "likely" would have 
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"completed his probationary period earlier." Aplt.Br.10. But he offers no 
reasoning why this was so. Because Murray violated his probation, the 
district court was free to extend the period of his original probation. Utah 
Code Ann. §77-18-1(12)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2017-2018). And the court 
apparently believed that an additional 12 months of probation was 
appropriate. Murray offers no reasoned analysis why the court would have 
reached a different conclusion about how much longer to keep him on 
probation under the original probation instead of under revoked and 
reinstated probation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted on November 22, 2017. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
I 
Deputy Solicitor General 
Counsel for A ppellee 
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Utah Code Annotated§ 77-18-1 (West2017) Suspension of sentence--Pleas held 
in abeyance--Pro bation--Supervision--Presentence investigation--Standards--
Confidentiality--Terms and conditions--Termination, revocation, modification, 
or extension--Hearings--Elech·onic monitoring 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction with a 
plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as provided 
in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the plea in 
abeyance agreement. 
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty with a mental illness, no contest, or conviction of 
any crime or offense, the court may, after hnposing sentence, suspend the 
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court 
may place the defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation under the supervision of an agency of local government 
or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on court probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court. 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the 
department is with the deparhnent. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. 
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(iv) Court probation may include an administrative level of services, 
including notification to the court of scheduled periodic reviews of the 
probationer's compliance with conditions. 
(c) Supervised probation services provided by the department, an agency of 
local government, or a private organization shall specifically address the 
offender's risk of reoffending as identified by a validated risk and needs 
screening or assessment. 
(3) (a) The departlnent shall establish supervision and presentence investigation 
standards for all individuals referred to the deparhnent. These standards shall 
be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the results of a risk and needs assessment; 
(iii) the de1nand for services; 
(iv) the availability of agency resources; 
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(v) public safety; and 
(vi) other criteria established by the departinent to detennine what level of 
services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to 
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis 
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department. 
(c) The Judicial Council and the deparhnent shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the deparhnent shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the deparhnent shall annually prepare an impact 
report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required to 
supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misde1neanors or 
infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C 
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the deparhnent may supervise the 
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards. 
(5) (a) Before the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concurrence 
of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence 
investigation report from the department or infonnation fr01n other sources 
about the defendant. 
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include: 
(i) a victim iinpact statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-
203 describing the effect of the crhne on the victim and the victim1s family; 
(ii) a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a 
recommendation from the departlnent regarding the payment of 
restitution with interest by the defendant in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act; 
(iii) findings from any screening and any assessment of the offender 
conducted under Section 77:18:11; 
(iv) recommendations for ti·eatment of the offender; and 
(v) the number of days since the commission of the offense that the 
offender has spent in the custody of the jail and the number of days, if any, 
the offender was released to a supervised release or alternative 
incarceration program under Section 17-22-5.5. 
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(c) The contents of the presentence investigation report are protected and are 
not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by 
rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the deparhnent. 
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the 
defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the 
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. 
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have 
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall 
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant 
an additional 10 working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report 
with the departn1ent. If after 10 working days the inaccuracies cannot be 
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on 
the record. 
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. 
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or 
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present 
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information 
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court 1nay require 
that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(i) provide for the support of others for whose support the defendant is 
legally liable; 
(ii) participate in available treatment programs, including any treahnent 
program in which the defendant is currently participating, if the program 
is acceptable to the court; 
(iii) if on probation for a felony offense, serve a period of time, not to 
exceed one year, in a county jail designated by the deparhnent, after 
considering any recommendation by the court as to which jail the court 
finds most appropriate; 
(iv) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of 
electronic monitoring; 
(v) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the 
compensatory service program provided in Section 76-6-107.1; 
(vi) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
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(vii) 1nake restitution or reparation to the victhn or victhns with interest in 
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victilns Restitution Act; and 
(viii) comply with other tenns and conditions the court considers 
appropriate to ensure public safety or increase a defendant's likelihood of 
success on probation; and 
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997: 
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation 
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's 
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED 
certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or 
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items listed 
in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of: 
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or 
(B) other justified cause. 
(9) The departinent shall collect and disburse the accounts receivable as defined 
by Section 77-32a-101, with interest and any other costs assessed under Section 
64-13-21 during: 
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with 
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and 
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised 
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance 
with Subsection (10). 
(10) (a)(i) Probation 1nay be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court 
or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or 
class A misde1neanor cases, 12 months in cases of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or as allowed pursuant to Section 64-13-
21 regarding earned credits. 
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under 
Subsection (l0)(a)(i), there re1nains an unpaid balance upon the 
accounts receivable as defined in Section 77-32a-101, the court may 
retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench 
probation for the lin1ited purpose of enforcing the payment of the 
account receivable. If the court retains jurisdiction for this limited 
purpose, the court may order the defendant to pay to the court the costs 
associated with continued probation under this Subsection (10). 
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the 
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded 
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and ilnmediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the 
Office of State Debt Collection. 
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor, victim, 
or upon its own 1notion, the court may require the defendant to show 
cause why the defendant's failure to pay should not be h·eated as contempt 
of court. 
(b) (i) The deparhnent shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State 
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all 
cases when termination of supervised probation is being requested by the 
departinent or will occur by law. 
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete 
report of details on outstanding accounts receivable. 
(11) (a)(i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confine1nent after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to 
revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total 
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke 
the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of thne 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the 
hearing. 
(iii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation constitutes service of time toward a 
tenn of incarceration imposed as a result of the revocation of probation or 
a graduated sanction imposed under Section 63M-7-404. 
(b) The rmming of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation 
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by the 
court. 
(12) (a)(i) Probation may be modified as is consistent with the graduated 
sanctions and incentives developed by the Utah Sentencing Commission 
under Section 63M-7-404, but the length of probation may not be extended, 
except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and 
a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of 
probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
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(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted 
to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that 
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable 
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is 
justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be 
served on the defendant a warrant for the defendant's arrest or a copy of 
the affidavit and an order to show cause why the defendant's probation 
should not be revoked, 1nodified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hearing 
and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed if the 
defendant is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also infonn the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
( d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall ad1nit or deny the allegations of the 
affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting 
attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning 
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. 
(iv) The defendant 1nay call witnesses, appear and speak in the defendant's 
own behalf, and present evidence. 
( e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, 
the court 1nay order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or 
reinstated for all or a portion of the original term of probation. 
(iii) If a period of incarceration is imposed for a violation, the defendant 
shall be sentenced within the guidelines established by the Utah 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to Subsection 63M-7-404(4), unless the 
judge detennines that: 
(A) the defendant needs substance abuse or mental health tTeabnent, as 
determined by a validated risk and needs screening and assessment, 
that warrants treatment services that are irmnediately available in the 
c01n1nunity; or 
(B) the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
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(iv) If the defendant had, prior to the i1nposition of a term of incarceration 
or the execution of the previously i1nposed sentence under this Subsection 
(12), served time in jail as a condition of probation or due to a violation of 
probation under Subsection (12)(e)(iii), the time the probationer served in 
jail constitutes service of time toward the sentence previously imposed. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself or herself to the 
custody of the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treahnent at 
the Utah State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after 
the superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or the superintendent's designee 
has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the state 
hospital; 
(b) h·eatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for 
treahnent over the defendants described in this Subsection (13). 
(14) Presentence investigation reports are classified protected in accordance with 
Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Manage1nent Act. 
Notwithstanding Sections 63G-2-403 and 63G-2-404, the State Records 
Co1nmittee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. 
Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the 
department may disclose the presentence investigation only when: 
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63G-2-202(7); 
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the 
department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the 
offender; 
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; 
( d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the 
subject's authorized representative; or 
( e) requested by the victin1 of the crime discussed in the presentence 
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that 
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to 
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the 
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on 
the victim or the victim's household. 
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation 
under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections 76-3-
406 and 76-5-406.5. 
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(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home 
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to 
the department in accordance with Subsection (16). 
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it may 
order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the 
court. 
(b) The elech·onic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate 
law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(c) The elech·onic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which 
require: 
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; and 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the 
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored. 
( d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement through 
electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section, it shall: 
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the 
Deparbnent of Corrections; 
(ii) order the department to place an electronic 1nonitoring device on the 
defendant and install electronic monitoring equip1nent in the residence of 
the defendant; and 
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home 
confinement to the department or the progra1n provider. 
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through 
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determirted to be 
indigent by the court. 
(f) The department may provide the elech·onic 1nonitoring described in this 
section either directly or by conh·act with a private provider. 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; DECEMBER 12, 2016 
JUDGE ANN BOYDEN 
(Transcriber's note: Identification of speakers 
may not be accurate with the audio recordings.) 
PROCEEDINGS 
(Time 10:59:48) 
MS. DUNROE: Travis Murray, please? 
THE COURT: Murray, thank you. 
Is Mr. Murray in custody? 
MS. DUNROE: He is. 
THE COURT: All right. With Mr. Murray, I am 
dealing with affidavits from AP&P alleging violations of the 
probation on this third degree DUI. I received the first one 
in February of 2016 but I have since received a more updated 
one but it's a month later. My most recent one is March 
MS. DUNROE: That's what I have as well and I 
confirmed with AP&P today that that's the most recent one 
they have. 
THE COURT: So how are we addressing those? 
MS. DUNROE: Can I have just a quick moment? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
MS. DUNROE: Judge, Mr. Murray intends to enter 
admissions to numbers 1, 4, 6 and 9. 
THE COURT: All right. And agreed upon 
1 
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recommendations, are we looking at what has - the 
recommendation is closing with jail time? Is he serving 
other ... 
MS. DUNROE: No, he's not currently serving any 
other commitments. We don't stipulate to the jail that will 
be requested by AP&P. We have a separate -
THE COURT: You want to make some argument with 
that, but there hasn't been an agreed upon. And it's 1, 3, 4, 
and 9 or what? 
MS. DUNROE: It's 1, 4, 6 and 9. 
THE COURT: That's actually what I circled but then 
I didn't trust my numbers. 
MS. DUNROE: And numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 result 
from events that ended up in the filing of Justice Court case 
number -
THE COURT: All from the same date? And that's how 
it was resolved was No. 4? 
MS. DUNROE: Correct, well, 4 and 6. 
THE COURT: Four and 6, so that makes sense to that 
one. 
All right Mr. Murray, this makes sense to me. What 
you need to know before you make any admissions is we're not 
dealing with the case in the justice court, we're dealing 
with how I should address a third degree DUI that you're on 
probation for. If you admit that you're not compliant or if 
2 
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I find that you're not compliant, you risk losing the 
privilege of probation altogether and having the zero to five 
years prison sentence imposed. Do you understand that? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Without any further evidentiary 
hearing, is it your decision to make those admissions to me 
today or do you want me to set it for - you want to make the 
admissions today as your attorney has said or do you want me 
to set it for an evidentiary hearing? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: No ma'am, I'd just like to move 
forward with -
THE COURT: With those admissions today? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Yes. 
THE COURT: Number 1 is that you used alcohol, 
meth, and cocaine on October - excuse me - January 8 th of 
2016, you admit that? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: The next line also includes opiates. 
All four substances on that January 8 th date? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: Number 4 is that you committed the 
offense of ignition interlock on February 20 th , did you plead 
guilty to that Class C Misdemeanor in justice court? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And No. 6 is that you committed the 
3 
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offense of operating the vehicle without insurance, a Class C 
Misdemeanor from the same date. Was that part of your plea? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Yes, ma'am. 
THE COURT: And No. 9 is you did not report on 
February 23 rd • Do you admit that as well? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: All of these are 2016 dates. 
I will accept admissions to number 1, 4, 6, and 9 
as knowingly made today and strike the remaining conditions 
today. 
today. 
Those admissions are certainly a basis for my ruling 
What is the State and AP&P asking for and then I'll 
let the defense respond? 
MR. ?: Your Honor, the defendant basically said he 
didn't want to do supervision. He even - AP&P attempted to 
work with him by giving him room sanctions after the 
violations and he said - we ordered him to report and he, and 
I see a quote that said uYeah, I don't, I don't know about 
that." So he's just basically saying whatever AP&P wants, 
I'm going to do what I want and he got new charges while on 
probation. He pled to those in a prior to us knowing about 
them, he pled guilty. I think a year imposed would be a 
reasonable offer on this, just because he doesn't want to do 
probation. 
THE COURT: One of the allegations that we did not 
4 
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address was the, his leaving the state, that he didn't report 
on those days and -
MR. ?: Yes, there are several instances where he 
had phone conversations with his agent where he was out-of-
state in California, Wyoming, Idaho which is in direct 
violation of his probation agreement. 
THE COURT: Okay, all right. Thank you. 
And does the State have anything further? 
MR. SUTTON: Your Honor, the State would submit on 
that recommendation from AP&P (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay, thank you. Then the defendant's 
response? 
MS. DUNROE: I absolutely see how AP&P could have 
taken Mr. Murray's words and actions as a signal of 
disrespect. I don't think he intended them that way. Mr. 
Murray, for perhaps the first time in his life, was met with 
a situation of homelessness. It's not one he had encountered 
before then and it was the homelessness that he did not deal 
with in an appropriate way. And, you know, I say that, I 
don't know what I would do to deal with homelessness but that 
is the situation he found himself in. His father could offer 
him both a place to live and a job and I think during those 
time periods he was with his dad, he was sober. The 
conversations that maybe preceded that when he did test 
positive for the use of drugs, they did come at a time when 
5 
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he had relapsed and I don't know that we should read too much 
into what someone whose under the influence of substances, 
you know, may have to say about doing treatment. 
But it is clear that Mr. Murray actually has 
established himself as someone who is able and willing to 
complete treatment and he already did. 
Now, certainly his actions after that show that he 
could benefit from more treatment and that's not uncommon 
either but AP&P has reported that his treatment provider made 
them aware that he did complete treatment and he did. That 
was prior to the relapse which is what happened. I 
understand - which is why I think that he could benefit from 
additional treatment but that is not to say that Mr. Murray 
ever intended to just run away and to not deal with any of 
this. He dealt with this situation in a way that I think 
came out of a situation of fear and perhaps some 
irresponsibility. He and I have discussed that and he 
understands that what he did was not appropriate, that he 
needs to stay in the state. He tells me the situation that 
is different now is that he does in fact have a place to live 
in the state which he previously did not have. That's a 
somewhat new development for him and that he can stay in the 
state and would very much like to complete probation because 
he did do well. He did well for a while. He was unable to 
pay the fine which I think is why his probation wasn't closed 
6 
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out sooner but that's not uncommon with a fine of close to 
$3000. And he would very much like the opportunity to do 
treatment again, to do treatment and probation. He thinks he 
can complete it, he wants to complete it and frankly, he's 
already shown us that he has the ability and the desire to at 
least complete the treatment portion. 
Again, his plan, and I think AP&P's ideas for him 
sort of went off the rails when he was met with that 
homelessness and it was a pretty substantial thing for him in 
his life, a very stressful event that he did not handle 
appropriately and obviously that caused him to be in 
violation of his probation. 
THE COURT: Have there been any new charges other 
than this February 20 th case with -
MS. DUNROE: The AP&P agent and I were able to find 
a retail theft case that was filed on the date he was booked 
into jail. 
THE COURT: And when was that? 
MS. DUNROE: That was November 22~. 
THE COURT: And that's why my next question was 
what ultimately brought him into jail was a new arrest and a 
new offense, is that -
MS. DUNROE: That has not been adjudicated and he 
very much maintains his innocense there. He has, to my 
knowledge, at least what he tells me is a retail theft is not 
7 
OOim Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
something he's ever committed. He doesn't have a history of 
theft offenses and he was with a group of people who may have 
been guilty of that and then he was also arrested for guilty 
by association. So I understand he intends to fight that 
case and that one has not been adjudicated, there's not even 
a court date for it. 
THE COURT: And is it still hoiding him or is only 
my warrant on this non-compliance? 
MS. DUNROE: I don't have his most current booking 
sheet to be able to tell you that but we did find it -
THE COURT: And he's been in jail since November 
20 th on that arrest or whatever that is. 
MS. DUNROE: November 22~. 
THE COURT: Twenty-two. And all right. 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: May I have a quick word? 
THE COURT: I'm going to let you respond 
ultimately, you get the last word. There were a couple more 
questions I just wanted to clarify and I may have. I think I 
did answer it. What is it that you want me to know? 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: One thing my attorney has 
already kind of touched on this already but I do have the 
will to remain sober and clean. I've shown that for AP&P, 
for the last three years by completing courses. I've had UAs 
throughout the entire process and haven't really messed up 
until basically after the three years was suppose to be up 
8 
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but due to not being able to pay the fines, then dealing with 
not having a place to live, kind of got the better of me but 
I would like to get back on the right track and remain clean 
and get a job and be a productive member of society. And 
there was one other thing that I wanted to say but I've 
forgotten at this point. 
Yeah, as far as the absconding, I just wanted to 
say that my dad was really just trying to help me out in a 
tight bind when I didn't have a place to live. One of his 
very strict rules was "there will be no drinking or drugs in 
my house or you will be homeless and I won't be able to help 
you from there" and I've done some - I've helped my dad, he 
owns a commercial plumbing business. He's not here today or 
able to verify that but he would verify for me that I was 
clean the entire time and working for him and when I came 
back, I had every intention of contacting Agent Whitehead who 
is my probation officer but, umrnm, things didn't work out the 
way I'd planned and was just basically hanging around with 
the wrong crowd and they were stealing from WalMart. I was 
guilty by association but did not steal anything from there 
and I had told the Walmart security repeatedly that as well 
so that should go okay. 
THE COURT: Well, and all of this is important 
information, Mr. Murray, but what you and your defense 
attorney are asking me to do is just kind of treat this 
00 i1)9 
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something different than it is. We are dealing with a third 
degree felony DUI. You don't even get to the level of a 
third degree DUI until you have a history of DUI and the 
sentence that was suspended was not a year in jail, that you 
don't really want to do because you just really relapsed and 
were just kind of doing what you thought was best or your dad 
though was best. You were on probation for a felony with a 
suspended prison sentence and that is the sentence that the 
law provides and I could very fairly impose at his point. 
The factors that you did well at the beginning of probation 
are factors that I take into consideration but this is not a 
case where you are just looking at possession of a controlled 
substance where you relapsed and now you want to get back on 
track and now you've got a better living situation. 
You are dealing with a DUI and the fact that you 
convicted of driving without the ignition interlock 
protections, the fact that you were consuming alcohol and 
weren't on probation and weren't compliant, is a danger, 
danger, dangerous situation to yourself, to your family and 
to the community as a whole and so the requests that are 
being made by all sides here - and what I take into 
consideration is, that you have failed to comply with felony 
DUI probation, not that you just decided to do this on your 
own. The answer when you found yourself homeless was going 
into AP&P and saying I've done two years of success, let's 
10 
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get this done, help me, I need treatment. It wasn't just 
saying, Well, I can blow it off and do it on my own not being 
responsive when AP&P instructed you to come back. The fact 
that you have done what you have done, Mr. Murray, is the 
basis for my not imposing the prison sentence right now. 
Your requests that you would like an opportunity to 
do this successfully and do treatment is going to be granted 
that I'm going to give you an opportunity but it is going to 
be with a significant sanction and it is going to be with the 
understanding that if you fail to comply, you're not getting 
a year in jail to close. 
So I am revoking and reinstating probation for a 
period of 12 months from today's date. The reason that it is 
so short a time is because you've done a longer time and 
because if you don't succeed, I'm going to be imposing the 
original sentence as the sanction. However, Mr. Murray, this 
is where the difference between your request for a simple 
possession, a simple relapse, a simple just trying to do it, 
is the factor. I am imposing a 180-day jail sentence 
beginning from November 22 nd with the order that you 
successfully complete the CATS Program in jail. You may be 
released upon successful completion of the CATS Program in 
jail and you go directly to AP&P and finish your year's worth 
of probation. If you don't complete CATS or if you don't 
qualify for CATS - and it looks like you can - then you 
11 
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simply serve the 180-day jail sanction. This is the way that 
you keep the prison sentence suspended and this the way that 
you can ultimately finish probation rather than just calling 
your own shots and having a year-long jail sentence for an 
unsuccessful completion. 
The financial obligations on a DUI are mandated so 
they are still in place and you still need to figure that 
out. 
Good luck, I think this is the only compromise that 
you can do but I do think it is a fair one for you. Good 
luck, thank you. ~ 
DEFENDANT MURRAY: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
(Transcript completed on January 26, 2017) 
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